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Executive Summary 
Every president except for two have granted pardons. Accompanying the frequent use of the 
pardon power is a long history of abuses. President Donald Trump’s controversial uses of the 
pardon power have presented an opportunity to think about how the pardon power is used. 
But any reform of the power should not be grounded in reacting to one particular president’s 
use of it. Instead, the focus must be ensuring that the integrity of the pardon power, as it is 
defined in Article II of the Constitution, is upheld and protected.  
This report advances a set of reform proposals to prevent abuses of the pardon power. Before 
reaching the discussion of those reforms, the report traces the history of the pardon power and 
describes reforms proposed by members of Congress over the last several decades.  
England’s king held the power to issue pardons starting in the seventh century. Parliament 
eventually imposed some limitations on the power, including preventing the monarch from 
granting pardons in cases of impeachment. In the 16th century, Parliament gained the ability to 
pardon by legislation. In the American colonies, most governors held pardon powers. However, 
when the Revolution ushered in distrust of executive power, many of the newly established 
states curtailed governors’ discretion over pardons. Most of the restrictions involved 
legislatures in the process. 
At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the delegates debated who should have the pardon 
power and how to place limitations on it. Some, especially Alexander Hamilton, argued in favor 
of a nearly unfetter power, similar to the British crown’s pardon authority. Hamilton believed 
the president might need to unilaterally exercise the power to quell “insurrection and 
rebellion.” He also reasoned that the president could grant pardons when the judicial process 
erred. The framers discussed several possible limitations on the pardon power, such as a ban on 
self-pardons and a requirement that the Senate approve any pardons. But they settled on only 
one explicit limitation: a prohibition on pardons “in cases of impeachment.” 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the pardon power in only a few cases. Its early 
jurisprudence on the subject interpreted the pardon power broadly. The Court has recognized 
some minor limitations on the power beyond those in the Constitution’s text, including a 
requirement that recipients accept pardons to make them effective. 
Contemporary state constitutions and regulations generally place more limitations on the 
pardon power than those in the federal Constitution. Although many states vest the pardon 
power in governors with minimal, if any, restrictions, others have the governor share the power 
with appointed or elected officials. A few states give the governor no role in the pardon 
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process. The vast majority of states ban pre-conviction pardons and require notification that a 
pardon is under consideration. 
Over the past half-century, members of Congress have introduced legislation to limit the 
pardon power. Those proposals have fallen into several categories: bans on self-pardons; bans 
self-interested pardons; bans pre-conviction and pre-indictment pardons; reforms to the 
process in the executive branch for issuing pardons; reforms to the timeframe within which 
pardons may be issued during a presidential term; and reforms to the Department of Justice’s 
Office of the Pardon Attorney. 
This report endorses three reforms: a legislative ban on the president’s ability to pardon 
himself or herself; a legislative ban on the president’s ability to grant pre-conduct pardons; and 
two executive orders that would (1) institute post hoc reporting requirements if and when the 
president pardons a family member or close associate and (2) adopt norms and procedures to 
govern the process for considering, vetting, and implementing requests for grants of pardons. 
The post hoc reporting requirements would require that the executive branch transmit to 
Congress documents and materials relied on and used when considering and granting pardons 
to a president’s family member or close associate. The formalization of procedures would 
provide greater transparency and consistency to the pardon process. 
Bans on self-pardons and pre-conduct pardons may be achieved via constitutional amendment 
or legislation. While each option has its benefits and drawbacks, we ultimately favor legislation 
over amendments. It is highly unlikely that proposing and ratifying a constitutional amendment 
in today’s fractured political environment would be possible, and legislative bans on self-
pardons and pre-conduct pardons are, we contend, constitutionally permissible. Additionally, 
legislative bans might win enough bipartisan support for both houses of Congress to pass them 
and the president to sign them into law. 
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Introduction 
The pardon power is one of the least restrained presidential powers. It provides the president 
the “Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in 
Cases of Impeachment.”1 There are two explicit checks in the text of Article II, Section 2, Clause 
1. First, pardons are only permitted for crimes against the United States. Second, the pardon 
power does not extend to impeachment. 
For most of American history, presidents have used their pardon power to correct wrongs, 
forgive convicts, and temper justice with mercy.2 Several high-profile pardons have raised 
significant concerns about how presidents should use the power. These controversial pardons 
include President Richard Nixon’s pardon of Jimmy Hoffa; President Gerald Ford’s pardon of 
former President Nixon; President George H.W. Bush’s pardons of various officials involved in 
the Iran-Contra scandal; and President Bill Clinton’s pardon of Marc Rich. Some of President 
Trump’s pardons have also sparked backlash, such as his pardons of Sheriff Joe Arpaio,3 
Mathew Golsteyn, and Clint Lorance.4 His commutation of Roger Stone’s sentence for 
obstructing Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into the Trump campaign’s links to 
Russia also generated an outcry.5 After the conclusion of the Russia investigation, one of 




1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  
2 Paul Rosenzweig, Reflections on the Atrophying Pardon Power, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 593, 594 (2012); see 
also Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1169 (2010) 
(“For most of our nation’s history, the president’s constitutional pardon power has been used with generosity and 
regularity to correct systemic injustices and to advance the executive’s policy goals.”).  
3 Former Sheriff Joseph Arpaio was pardoned for a contempt of court conviction for disobeying a court order to 
stop immigration enforcement, “which was never a job mandated by state statutes for a county sheriff.” See 
Michael Kiefer & Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Arpaio Saga Not Over: Judge to Rule on Conviction, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 
30, 2017), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2017/08/29/judge-wont-vacate-former-sheriff-
joe-arpaios-contempt-conviction-without-oral-arguments/614854001/; Adam Liptak, Why Trump’s Pardon of 
Arpaio Follows Law, Yet Challenges It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/us/politics/trump-pardon-joe- arpaio-constitution.html. See also 
Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2012); Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 994 (D. 
Ariz. 2011). 
4 Army Maj. Mathew Golsteyn was to stand trial for allegedly executing a man suspected of being a Taliban bomb-
maker. Army First Lt. Clint Lorance was serving a 19-year sentence for ordering his soldiers to shoot at unarmed 
civilians in Afghanistan. See Dave Philipps, Trump Clears Three Service Members in War Crimes Cases, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/us/trump-pardons.html; Michael A. Robinson, Trump’s 
Pardon of Two Former Army Officers Has Sparked New Controversy. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/11/17/trumps-pardon-two-former-army-officers-has-sparked-
new-controversy-heres-why/. 
5 See Peter Baker et al., Trump Commutes Sentence of Roger Stone in Case He Long Denounced, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/10/us/politics/trump-roger-stone-clemency.html. 
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declined to cooperate with investigators because Trump dangled a pardon for him.6  
Furthermore, Trump’s beliefs about the extent of the pardon power have stoked controversy, 
specifically his tweeted declaration that he has “the absolute right” to pardon himself for any 
crime.7  
In evaluating the wisdom of a broad presidential pardon power, this report suggests reforms to 
address the following questions about when the pardon power may and should be employed: 
May Congress place limits on the presidential pardon power? May the president issue a self-
pardon? May the president grant a pardon before a crime has been committed or charged? 
May the president grant a pardon for a self-interested purpose?  
Part I reviews the foundations and history of the presidential pardon power, tracing its 
development from England into the United States Constitution, analyzing Supreme Court 
precedent on the pardon power, and surveying state pardon powers to see whether they can 
provide an effective model for a reformed presidential pardon power. Parts II and III highlight 
various proposals for reforming the presidential pardon power and describe the benefits and 
drawbacks of the bills that members of Congress have previously introduced. Part IV analyzes 
the wisdom of a broad presidential pardon power and whether reform is necessary to prevent 
abuses of it. Part V presents out recommendations to reform the pardon power. 
I. History of the Presidential Pardon Power 
The executive pardon power existed long before the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The 
framers drew on the experiences with the pardon power in England and the colonies when 
drafting the Constitution’s presidential pardon power clause.8 This Part examines the British 
model of the pardon power and its importation to the American colonies through the royal 
governors. Then, this Part examines the pardon power in early state constitutions and the 
framers’ conception of the pardon power at the Constitutional Convention. Next, this Part 
analyzes the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the presidential pardon power. Last, this Part 




6 Devlin Barrett, A Searing Look at the Mueller Investigation, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2020, 1:53 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/a-searing-look-at-the-mueller-investigation--from-the-
inside/2020/09/22/991cccc8-f6c7-11ea-be57-d00bb9bc632d_story.html. See also George Packer, The Inside Story 
of the Mueller Probe’s Mistakes, ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/09/andrew-weissmann-mueller-book-where-law-
ends/616395/ (“Trump’s pardon power was an obstacle that the prosecutors didn’t anticipate and could never 
overcome. It kept them from being able to push uncooperative targets as hard as in an ordinary criminal case.”). 
7 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 4, 2018, 8:35 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1003616210922147841. 
8 See Kristen H. Fowler, Limiting the Federal Pardon Power, 83 IND. L. J. 1651, 1654 (2008). 
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 Establishment of the Presidential Pardon Power 
Influential English jurist Sir William Blackstone warned that the pardon power is not 
appropriate for a democracy.9 Yet the framers rejected Blackstone’s position and supported 
inclusion of a broad executive pardon power in the Constitution that resembled the power as it 
existed in England.  
1.  The Pardon Power in England 
“This [pardoning power] is indeed one of the great advantages of a monarchy in general, 
above any other form of government; … In democracies, however, this power of pardon can 
never subsist; for there nothing higher is acknowledged than the magistrate who administers 
the laws: and it would be impolitic for the power of judging and pardoning to center in one 
and the same person.”10                                                                                        
– Sir William Blackstone 
 
The English Crown’s pardoning power was fairly expansive. The king possessed the pardon 
power starting in the seventh century,11 and, before the 17th century, the monarch’s power was 
absolute.12 Although the Crown eventually came to solely hold the pardon power, there had 
been competition for the power from “the clergy, the great earls, and the feudal courts,” 
among others.13 In 1535, Henry VIII seized the pardon power by persuading Parliament to pass 
an act that committed to the king the “‘sole power and auctoritie’ to pardon or remit treasons, 
murders, manslaughters, felonies, or outlawries.”14  
But Parliament limited the monarch’s pardoning power after Charles II used the power to 
stymie Parliament’s efforts to impeach Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby and the Lord High 
Treasurer of England.15 In the aftermath of the failed Osborne impeachment, Parliament 
curtailed the royal pardon power through several measures. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 




9 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *397. 
10 Id. 
11 See Fowler, supra note 8, at 1654; Michael A. Genovese & Kristine Almquist, The Pardon Power Under Clinton: 
Tested But Intact, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE LAW: THE CLINTON LEGACY 76 (David Gray Alder & Michael A. Genovese 
eds., 2002). 
12 See William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 487 
(1977). 
13 Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 
586 (1991). 
14 Id. 
15 Ashley M. Steiner, Remission of Guilt or Removal of Punishment? The Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 46 EMORY 
L.J. 959, 963 (1997). 
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causing others to be imprisoned outside of England.”16 In 1689, Parliament prevented ministers 
of state from receiving immunity from impeachment through royal pardons.17 The 1701 Act of 
Settlement permanently removed the Crown’s power to pardon in cases of impeachment.18 
And, in 1721, Parliament gained the right to pardon by legislation.19 
2. Pardon Power in Early State Constitutions 
The pardon power was exported to colonial America.20 Most colonial charters had provisions 
for the use of a pardon, which was delegated by the king.21 The charters of Virginia, 
Massachusetts, the Carolinas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Georgia placed the pardon power 
in the executive.22 Connecticut and Rhode Island placed the power in the legislature, but only 
with the governor and six of the assistant governors being present.23 However, the 
Revolutionary War’s “spirit of distrust in strong executive authority”24 and the experiences with 
an all-too-powerful monarch led states to shortly thereafter place the pardon power in the 
hands of “the legislature and governor jointly, or in the legislature alone.”25   
The new state constitutions of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
Virginia provided that the governor could exercise the pardon power only with consent of the 
executive council.26 Although Vermont was not one of the original states, its constitution of 
1777 provided for a similar shared exercise of the pardon power.27 Rhode Island and 
Connecticut did not make changes and retained their constitutions for several years.28 
Georgia’s constitution merely granted the governor the power to “reprieve a criminal or 




16 Kobil, supra note 13, at 587-88; Duker, supra note 12, at 495. 
17 See Duker, supra note 12, at 495-96. 
18 Kobil, supra note 13, at 588. The Act of Settlement stated “[t]hat no Pardon under the Great Seal of England 
[shall] be pleadable to an Impeachment by the Commons in Parliament.” Act of Settlement, 1701, 7 Geo. 1, c. 29 
(Eng.). 
19 See Kobil, supra note 13, at 588. 
20 See Genovese & Almquist, supra note 11, at 77-78. See also Duker, supra note 12, at 498 (describing broad types 
of pardon powers given to various colonial governors, which permitted pardons for any offense, even before 
conviction). 
21 CHRISTEN JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER IN THE AMERICAN STATES 4 (1922). 
22 Id. at 4-8.  
23 Id. at 5. See CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT (1662); CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS (1663). 
24 Jonathan T. Menitove, The Problematic Presidential Pardon: A Proposal for Reforming Federal Clemency, HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 447, 449 (2009). 
25 Steiner, supra note 15, at 965; see also W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 13-14 (1941).  
26 JENSEN, supra note 21, at 10 (citing N.H. CONST. of 1784; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. ii, § 1, art. VIII; N.J. CONST. 
of 1776, pt. IX; PA. CONST. of 1776, § 20; VA. CONST. of 1776). 
27 Id. (citing VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. ii, § 18). 
28 Id. 
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judge fit.”29 The pardon power was vested in the governor alone in New York, Delaware, 
Maryland, and the Carolinas.30 States eventually began increasing the powers of the governor, 
which resulted in the enlargement of the pardon power.31 At the time of their admission into 
the Union, 26 of 35 states vested the pardon power in the governor.32  
3. Pardon Power Debates During the Constitutional Convention 
Although neither of the significant plans proposed at the start of the Constitutional 
Convention—the New Jersey and Virginia Plans—provided for pardon power,33 delegates 
generally agreed on the need for some form of the power.34 The pardon power entered the 
debate at the urging of Alexander Hamilton, Charles Pinckney, and John Rutledge, and through 
a proposed provision calling for the power to be nearly as extensive as England’s broad 
executive pardon power.35 The relatively minimal debate at the Convention concerned who 
should exercise the power and what limitations should be placed on it.36 
Alexander Hamilton’s emphatic arguments for a broad pardon power may have been critical to 
blocking many limitations. Hamilton was a vocal proponent of giving one person the pardon 
power to allow for greater accountability, efficiency, and energy in the exercise of the power: 
[O]ne man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government, than a body of 
men . . . [T]he principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in . . . the Chief 
Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection and rebellion there are often critical moments, 
when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the 
commonwealth; . . . The dilatory process of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, for 
the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of 




29 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing GA. CONST. of 1789, art. II, § 7). 
30 Id. (citing S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 7; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XVIII; DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. VII; MD. CONST. of 
1776, art. XXXIII; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX). 
31 Id. The vesting of the pardon power in the governor alone occurred in Georgia in 1789, Pennsylvania in 1790, 
and Virginia in 1850. Id. (citing VA. CONST. of 1850, art. V, § 5; PA. CONST. of 1790, pt. 2, § 9; GA. CONST. of 1789, art. 
II, § 7).  
32 Id. 
33 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20-23 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (Virginia Plan); id. at 243-
45 (New Jersey Plan). 
34 John Dinan, The Pardon Power and the American State Constitutional Tradition, 35 POLITY 389, 394 (2003).  
35 Duker, supra note 12, at 501 (citing 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT 
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 380 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845)).  
36 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 411-26 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
37 Duker, supra note 12, at 505-06 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
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In advocating for the president to have a broad power to bestow mercy onto others, Hamilton 
assumed the president would act in good faith. He envisioned that the president would exercise 
the pardon power with “[h]umanity and good policy,” and thus “the benign prerogative of 
pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed.”38 Hamilton believed that the 
president would exercise the pardon power fairly because holding another’s fate in his hands 
“would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution,” and “the dread of being accused of 
weakness or connivance, would beget equal circumspection.”39 Hamilton envisioned the 
president as an “eligible dispenser of the mercy of government” because the judicial process 
might err, and “without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would 
wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.”40 Thus, the framers designed the pardon power 
to temper justice with mercy and to serve the public good. 
The framers had few recorded discussions at the Convention about the pardon power, aside 
from some unsuccessful attempts to restrict its scope.41 The Committee of Detail’s report, 
issued as the delegates were nearing the end of their work, kept the president as the only 
source of pardons and, similar to the English Act of Settlement, provided that presidential 
pardons “shall not be pleadable in Bar of an Impeachment.”42 Unsuccessful proposals to limit 
the pardon power would have required Senate consent for pardons,43 forbid pre-conviction 
pardons,44 forbid pardons for treason “because the President may himself be guilty,”45 and 
forbid pardons to protect oneself.46 The only modification to the pardon provision came from 
George Mason, who convinced his fellow delegates to prevent the president from issuing 
pardons “in cases of impeachment.”47 The pardon provision that emerged from the Convention 









41 Kobil, supra note 13, at 590. 
42 Id. 
43 Duker, supra note 12, at 501 (citing 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT 
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 480 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845)); Paul F. Eckstein & Mikaela Colby, Presidential Pardon 
Power: Are There Limits, and If Not, Should There Be?, 51 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 71, 77 (2019) (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 626 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).  
44 Duker, supra note 12, at 501-02; Eckstein & Colby, supra note 43, at 78.  
45 Duker, supra note 12, at 502 (citing 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT 
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 549 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845)). 
46 Eckstein & Colby, supra note 43, at 78 (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 626 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911)).  
47 Menitove, supra note 24, at 450.  
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 Supreme Court’s Broad Interpretation of the Pardon Power 
Although the Supreme Court has infrequently ruled on the pardon power’s scope, “[c]onsistent 
with the framers’ design, the Supreme Court has interpreted the President’s pardon power 
broadly.”48 The Supreme Court has, on two occasions, invalidated congressional limitations on 
the pardon power. In Ex parte Garland, one of the first cases to address the scope of the 
presidential pardon power, the Court proclaimed the power to be “unlimited, with the 
exception [of impeachment].”49 The Garland Court further stated that the pardon power 
“extends to every offence known to the law and may be exercised at any time after its 
commission.”50 Similarly, in United States v. Klein, the Court stated that the pardon power was 
exclusively “[en]trusted” to the president “without limit” and that the Constitution does not 
allow Congress to “change the effect of such a pardon any more than the executive can change 
a law.”51 In Schick v. Reed, the Court upheld President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s commutation of 
a death sentence to life imprisonment without parole, stating that “the pardoning power is an 
enumerated power of the Constitution and that its limitations, if any, must be found in the 
Constitution itself.”52 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that the power “cannot be modified, 
abridged, or diminished by the Congress.”53   
While the Supreme Court has never expressly overruled the unlimited nature of the pardon 
power, several cases provide a series of limits that may arguably have scaled back the unlimited 
pardon power as envisioned in Garland and Klein. In the 1877 case Knote v. United States, the 
Court held that the recipient of a pardon is not entitled to proceeds from the sale of property 
confiscated from him in relation to the judgment for the pardoned crime.54 Thus, the 
“president’s ability to issue a pardon halts at the gates of the nation’s treasury, controlled and 
funded by the legislative branch, because the money became ‘vested’ in the United States.”55 
This reasoning “indirectly provid[ed] a separation of powers justification for prescribing 




48 See Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, If Trump Pardons, It Could Be A Crime, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/opinion/if-trump-pardons-crime-russia.html.  
49 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866). 
50 Id. at 380.  
51 80 U.S. 128, 147-48 (1871). 
52 419 U.S. 256, 267 (1974). 
53 Id. at 266.  
54 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877). The Court held that once monies have been paid to U.S. Treasury, “the right to them has 
so far become vested in the United States that they can only be secured to the former owner of the property 
through an act of Congress,” and a pardon “cannot touch moneys in the treasury of the United States.” Id. 
55 Zachary J. Broughton, Constitutional Law—I Beg Your Pardon: Ex Parte Garland Overruled; The Presidential 
Pardon is No Longer Unlimited, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 183, 202 (2019). 
56 Id. 
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The Court next held in United States v. Wilson,57 and subsequently reaffirmed in Burdick v. 
United States,58 that a pardonee must accept a pardon for it to be valid. In its most recent 
clemency case, the Court demonstrated a potential shift in its jurisprudence. In addition to 
recognizing that the pardon power is limited in some capacity, the Court in Ohio Adult Parole 
Auth. v. Woodward, which involved a clemency proceeding at the state level, indicated that 
judicial review of pardons is appropriate.59 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for four justices,  
reaffirmed an earlier holding that pardon “decisions . . . are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects 
for judicial review.”60 However, Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence in part, and Justice 
Stevens, in his concurrence in part and dissent in part, agreed that the courts could review a 
pardon if the pardon implicates due process concerns or is arbitrarily implemented.61 Although 
the dearth of pardon power jurisprudence makes it difficult to determine what the Supreme 
Court might recognize as a constitutionally offensive pardon, the president’s power to pardon 
may not be as unlimited as the Court’s early rulings indicated. 
 The Pardon Power in Current State Constitutions 
“[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . .” 
Justice Louis Brandeis, dissenting in 
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
 
States’ current approaches to the pardon power inform our assessment of various proposals for 
reform at the federal level. A survey of current state constitutions62 makes clear that, although 
plenty embrace robust executive clemency powers, many others reject the Hamiltonian model, 
insofar as they have provided for participation of officials other than the executive in the 
exercise of the pardon power and have imposed various restrictions. As of the start of the 21st 




57 32 U.S. 150, 161 (1833). 
58 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915). 
59 523 U.S. 272, 280 (1998). 
60 Id. at 276 (citing Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981)). 
61 Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 523 U.S. at 289 (1998) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[S]ome minimal procedural 
safeguards apply to clemency proceedings. Judicial intervention might . . . be warranted in . . . a scheme whereby a 
state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the State arbitrarily denied 
a prisoner any access to its clemency process.” (emphasis in original)); Id. at 292 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“There are valid reasons for concluding that even if due process is required in clemency 
proceedings, only the most basic elements of fair procedure are required. Presumably a State might eliminate this 
aspect of capital sentencing entirely, and it unquestionably may allow the executive virtually unfettered discretion 
in determining the merits of appeals for mercy. Nevertheless, there are equally valid reasons for concluding that 
these proceedings are not entirely exempt from judicial review.”). 
62 The various state approaches to the pardon power are presented in a chart in Appendix A and based on 
information from Margaret Colgate Love, Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process: What the President Can Learn 
from the States, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 730 (2012). 
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five states demand that pardons be accompanied by the reasons for their issuance; and thirty-
seven states prohibit pre-conviction pardons.”63 Thus, states have long recognized the need to 
prevent abuses of the pardon power.  
Every current state constitution has a provision related to the executive pardon power, and 
most regulate the power to some extent.64 Six state constitutions give the governor “little or no 
role” in the pardon process, and the pardon power resides with an independent board that the 
governor appoints and which is “heavily regulated” and “conduct[s] most of [its] business in 
public.”65 In 21 of the 44 states where “the governor exercises most or all of the pardon 
power,” the governor sometimes “shares power with other elected or appointed officials” or 
with “an administrative board that is also responsible for prison releases.”66 In 23 states, the 
governor is authorized to pardon by law and is not required to consult with other officials 
before doing so, although some of these states permit some legislative regulation of the 
“manner of applying” pardons67 and some require the governor to report to the legislature 
after a pardon is granted.68 The wide variety of pardoning policies in the current state 
constitutions makes it hard to generalize about which model is most effective. However, in 
analyzing the frequency of pardon grants and the regularity of the pardon process, it appears 
that the states in which the pardon plays the most functional role are those in which the 
decision-making authority is shared with other officials.69 
II. Tracking Proposals to Reform the Pardon Power 
Members of Congress have made many attempts to pass legislation to clarify the scope of the 
president’s pardon power. Appendix B lists all available bills proposed by members of the 
House of Representatives and Senate since 1974. To clarify the data collected for this report, 
the proposed bills are further categorized into categories of reforms. Those categories include 
bans on self-pardons; self-interested pardons; pre-conviction and pre-indictment pardons; and 
other proposals including, reforms to the process in the executive branch for issuing pardons; 
reforms to the timeframe within which pardons may be issued during a presidential term; and 




63 Dinan, supra note 34, at 411. 
64 Fowler, supra note 8, at 1662. 
65 Love, supra note 62, at 743-44. See also infra Appendix A. 
66 Love, supra note 62, at 745. 
67 Id. at 747. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (governor pardons “subject to such regulation as may be prescribed 
by law relative to the manner of applying”). Some state constitutions give legislatures significant authority to 
regulate the pardon power. See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. V, § 17 (governor may pardon “subject to such regulations as 
may be provided by law”). 
68 Love, supra note 62, at 747. 
69 Id. 
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finalized in the fall of 2020, the chairs of several House committees introduced legislation with 
provisions that fall into several of these categories. The Protecting Our Democracy Act would 
outlaw self-pardons; require the executive branch to provide information to Congress about 
“any self-serving presidential pardon or commutation in cases involving the President or his/her 
relatives, contempt of Congress, or obstruction of Congress”; and would clarify that “the 
President and Vice President are ‘public officials’ and pardons are ‘official acts’ and ‘things of 
value’ for purposes of the federal bribery statute.”70 
The record of legislation that we review here does not include proposals for reforming the 
pardon power to prohibit pardoning specific individuals or resolutions expressing disapproval of 
the use of the pardon power after historical events such as the Watergate and Iran-Contra 
scandals. For instance, several bills were proposed after both President Gerald Ford’s pardon of 
former President Richard Nixon and President Jimmy Carter’s blanket pardon of everyone who 
dodged the draft during the Vietnam War.71 
Additionally, in compiling this data, it became evident that some of the proposals fell into more 
than one category of reform. For instance, several proposals focused on banning a president 
from issuing a self-pardon, and also included language banning self-interested pardons.72  
Below are some statistics representing various insights we extracted from the collection and 
organization of bills concerning the pardon power: 
• Forty-four (44) bills concerning the pardon power have been introduced in Congress 
since 1974.  
• Eighty-one percent (81%) of proposed bills have been introduced by Democratic 
members of Congress since 1974.  
• 1974 was the year with the highest number of bills introduced concerning the pardon 




70 Press Release, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, House Democrats Introduce Landmark Reforms 
Package, the Protecting Our Democracy Act (Sept. 23, 2020), https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-
releases/house-democrats-introduce-landmark-reforms-package-the-protecting-our-democracy. 
71 See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 78, 95th Cong. (1977) (opposing the pardon for Vietnam related draft or military absence 
offences); S. Res. 40, 95th Cong. (1977) (opposing the pardon for Vietnam draft evaders); S. Res. 18, 95th Cong. 
(1977) (concerning the pardoning of Vietnam draft or military absence offences); H.R. Res. 1382, 93d Cong. (1974) 
(advocating for continued legal action against President Richard Nixon); H.R. Res. 1370, 93d Cong. (1974) 
(requesting materials from President Ford concerning his pardon of President Nixon); H.R. Res. 1367, 93d Cong. 
(1974) (concerning the pardon of President Nixon). 
72 See infra Appendix B.  
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• Twenty-four (24) bills concerned oversight proposals (~55%); Fourteen (14) bills 
proposed a ban on pre-conviction or pre-indictment pardons (~32%); Nine (9) bills 
proposed a ban on self-interested pardons (~20%); Six (6) bills proposed a ban on self-
pardons (~14%). 
• The bill with the most co-sponsors was H.R. Res. 523 (115th Congress), introduced by 
Rep. Karen Bass in 2017. This resolution expressed disapproval of self-pardons and 
pardons of family members and had 51 co-sponsors, all of whom were Democrats.73  
The following analysis attempts to provide further insight into the broad categories of reform 
that we have identified through the collection of all available bills introduced in Congress 
concerning the pardon power since 1974.  
 Ban on Self-Pardons  
A ban on self-pardons seeks to prevent a president from issuing a pardon to himself or herself. 
This proposal does not seek to merely address the recent claims by President Trump that he has 
“the absolute right to PARDON [himself].”74 Efforts to ban self-pardons date back to well before 
Trump took office in 2017. In 1975, former Representative Elizabeth Holtzman (D-NY-16) 
introduced three bills that included the stipulation that “[n]o President may pardon himself for 
any offense against the United States.”75 Notably, House Democrats have proposed three 
measures related to self-pardons since 2017.76 The first bill, introduced in 2017 and then 
reintroduced in 2019 by Representative Al Green (D-TX-09), sought to deny the president the 
“power to grant to himself a reprieve or pardon for an offense against the United States.”77 In 
2018, Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA-43) introduced a concurrent resolution that 
“[e]xpress[ed] the sense of Congress that the President does not have the authority under the 
Constitution to grant himself a reprieve or pardon for offenses against the United States.”78 
Sixteen other Democrats co-sponsored this resolution.79 
One advantage of banning self-pardons is that it is well-aligned with the memorandum the 
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel issued on August 5, 1974, in advance of 




73 H.R. Res. 523, 115th Cong. (2017). 
74 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 4, 2018, 8:35 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1003616210922147841.  
75 H.R.J. Res. 350, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R.J. Res. 232, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R.J. Res. 156, 94th Cong. (1975). 
76 See infra Appendix B. 
77 H.R.J. Res. 13, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R.J. Res. 115, 115th Cong. (2017).  
78 H.R. Con. Res. 132, 115th Cong. (2018). 
79 Id. 
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own case, [and that] the President cannot pardon himself.”80 However, some reject this 
proposal as unconstitutional because, they argue, “[the pardon] power is not subject to any 
textual limitation.”81 Furthermore, they contend that the Constitution’s impeachment provision 
provides a pre-existing check on self-pardons.   
 Ban on Self-Interested Pardons  
A ban on self-interested pardons seeks to prevent a president from pardoning individuals with 
whom he or she may have a relationship, like a government employee, business partner, 
former campaign employee, or family member, where the grant of a presidential pardon may 
appear biased or self-serving. Since 1975, there have been nine bills introduced in Congress 
that sought to ban self-interested pardons.82 Interestingly, the groups of people Congress is 
concerned about receiving self-interested pardons vary significantly. For instance, in 1988 
Representative Barbara Boxer (D-CA-06) proposed a constitutional amendment that would 
prohibit “the President from granting a pardon to an individual who has been employed by the 
Federal Government during such President’s term of office.”83 In 2008, however, 
Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY-08) was more concerned about reigning in self-interested 
pardons as applied to “senior members of [the president’s] administration.”84 More recent 
proposals, such as a proposed constitutional amendment originally introduced by 
Representative Steve Cohen (D-TN-09) in 2017 and again in 2019, seek to limit the president’s 
pardon power by removing the president’s ability to pardon close family members, current or 
former staff members, or paid employees of the president’s election campaign.85 
One of the advantages of the proposals to ban self-interested pardons is that they seek to 
further the policy of encouraging fair decision-making by the president. For instance, 
eliminating a president’s ability to pardon government employees or business partners would 
likely prevent the president from repaying associates who helped him or her politically or 
financially through a quid pro quo arrangement. However, a disadvantage of this proposal is 
that it does not reflect the fact that a president may have non-self-interested reasons for 
pardoning family members, staff, or business associates. A president could hypothetically 
develop a policy to grant pardons to non-violent drug offenders who have served a certain 
percentage of their sentence. It is possible that, as a result of this policy, a president may 




80 Presidential or Legislative Pardon of the President, 1 Op. O.L.C. 370, 370 (1974).  
81 Richard A. Epstein, Pardon Me, Said the President to Himself, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/pardon-me-said-the-president-to-himself-1528239773. 
82 See infra Appendix B.  
83 H.R.J. Res. 532, 100th Cong. (1988). 
84 H.R. Res. 1531, 110th Cong. (2008). 
85 H.R.J. Res. 8, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R.J. Res. 120, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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motivation for issuing the pardon. Accordingly, an absolute ban on self-interested pardons for 
family members might be over-inclusive.   
 Ban on Pre-Conviction or Pre-Indictment Pardons 
A ban on pre-conviction pardons prevents a president from issuing a pardon before the full 
legal process has concluded and an individual has been convicted of an offense, while a ban on 
pre-indictment pardons merely prevents a president from issuing a pardon before an individual 
has been charged with a crime. Since 1974, members of Congress have introduced 11 bills to 
ban pre-conviction pardons and one bill to ban pre-indictment pardons.86 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, five of these bills were introduced in 1974 by members of the House and 
Senate87 following President Ford’s pardon of former President Nixon, who was neither indicted 
nor convicted before his pardon was issued on September 8, 1974.88 For example, 
Representative Thomas A. Luken (D-OH-01) proposed a constitutional amendment that would 
permit the president “to grant pardons only after conviction, unless a majority of both Houses 
of Congress” approves the pardon before conviction.89 In the same year, Senator William 
Proxmire (D-WI) introduced similar language in a joint resolution with Representative John Dent 
(D-PA-21) stating that “[t]he President shall have the power to [issue a pardon] only after an 
individual has been convicted of offenses against the United States and sentenced therefor.”90 
Interest in reforming the pardon power continued after the 1970s. For example, in 1993, 
Representative Andrew Jacobs Jr. (D-IN-10) introduced a constitutional amendment attempting 
to ban the president from issuing pre-conviction pardons.91 This amendment was co-sponsored 
by 11 members of the House and is the only resolution relating to the presidential pardon 
power that was supported by an independent House member.92   
Only one bill has been introduced in Congress seeking to ban pre-indictment pardons.93 This 
bill, introduced in 1974 by Representative Ella Grasso (D-CT-06), provided that “no reprieve or 
pardon shall be granted until after the filing of an indictment or the formal commencement of 




86 See infra Appendix B. Additionally, one resolution was introduced in the House to express the “sense of 
Congress” that no one should receive a pre-conviction pardon. Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601 (Sept. 10, 1974). 
89 H.R.J. Res. 1145, 93d Cong. (1974). 
90 S.J. Res. 239, 93d Cong. (1974); H.R.J. Res. 1125, 93d Cong. (1974). 
91 H.R.J. Res. 32, 103d Cong. (1993). 
92 See infra Appendix B. 
93 See id. 
94 H.R.J. Res. 1138, 93d Cong. (1974). 
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1974, this bill was likely a response to President Ford’s decision to pardon former President 
Nixon prior to an indictment or conviction.95  
One advantage of a ban on pre-conviction or pre-indictment pardons is that it would support 
following the legal process—including investigation, indictment, discovery, plea bargaining, 
trial, and sentencing—in all cases. Furthermore, it would renew the sense that the pardon 
power is a check on failures of the judiciary, rather than a political tool. One disadvantage of a 
ban on pre-conviction or pre-indictment pardons is that it might lead to inefficiencies. The 
expense and time required to convict or indict someone is considerable—and seemingly wasted 
if the president has already decided to issue a pardon regardless of the outcome. Another 
disadvantage of this proposal is that it would likely require a constitutional amendment, which 
would take considerable, and potentially unattainable, political will to ratify.  
 Oversight Proposal  
Oversight proposals generally seek to impose some level of mandatory congressional 
involvement or signoff when a president wants to issue a pardon. Since 1974, 24 oversight bills 
have been introduced.96 Most recently, in 2019, Senator Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV) and 
Representative Adam Schiff (D-CA-28) introduced the Abuse of the Pardon Prevention Act, 
which would impose a document review requirement within 30 days after certain pardons have 
been granted.97 The bill “requires the Department of Justice to submit to Congress all 
investigative materials related to an offense for which the President pardons an individual 
if the offense arises from an investigation in which the President, or a relative of the President, 
is a target, subject, or witness.”98 The Abuse of the Pardon Prevention Act was co-sponsored by 
four members of the Senate and 27 members of the House, all of whom were Democrats.99 
One of the advantages of the oversight proposal is that it does not explicitly limit or constrain 
who the president can pardon, potentially making it more likely to pass through Congress than 
more stringent limitations on the pardon power. Furthermore, this proposal would not be 
difficult to implement because the Department of Justice, through the Office of the Pardon 
Attorney, is already involved in the pardoning process. Moreover, by introducing rigorous 




95 See Laura M. Holson, ‘No One Could Believe It’: When Ford Pardoned Nixon Four Decades Ago, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/us/politics/nixon-ford-pardon-watergate.html. 
96 See infra Appendix B. 
97 S. 2090, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 1627, 116th Cong. (2019). 
98 S. 2090, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 1627, 116th Cong. (2019).  
99 See infra Appendix B. 
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who seeks to use the pardon power as an instrument of obstruction in an investigation.”100 One 
of the disadvantages of this proposal is that it will likely be challenged under United States v. 
Klein, which states that the pardon power is entrusted to “the executive alone . . . and it is 
granted without limit.”101 Moreover, none of the 24 oversight proposals that have been 
introduced in Congress have won approval—a history that does not bode well for similar future 
legislation. 
 Timing Proposal 
Timing proposals seek to limit the timeframes during which a president may issue pardons. For 
example, in 2001, Representative Barney Frank (D-MA-04) introduced a bill that sought to limit 
a president from exercising the pardon power “between October 1 of a year in which a 
Presidential election occurs and January 21 of the year following.”102 One factor that may have 
influenced Representative Frank to introduce that specific reform was President Clinton’s 
issuance of 140 pardons on his final day in office, January 20, 2001.103 Among those who 
received a pardon was Marc Rich, whose former wife donated to the Democratic Party between 
1993 and 2001, including to Hillary Clinton’s Senate campaign and to the Clinton Library.104 In a 
New York Times op-ed, President Clinton wrote that the pardon was justified for foreign policy 
reasons and because Marc Rich had already paid his fines and donated generously to “Israeli 
charitable causes.”105 Clinton strongly denied that there was any “quid pro quo.”106 
One of the advantages of a timing proposal like Representative Frank’s is that it would reduce 
the likelihood of a president issuing self-serving pardons at the end of his or her term. One of 
the potential disadvantages of a limitation on the time at which presidents can issue pardons is 
that it could inadvertently block the issuance of appropriate pardons, curtailing the positive 




100 Press Release, Congressman Adam Schiff, Schiff Introduces Legislation to Prevent Abuse of Presidential Pardons 
(Mar. 7, 2019), https://schiff.house.gov/news/press-releases/schiff-introduces-legislation-to-prevent-abuse-of-
presidential-pardons. 
101 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871). 
102 H.R.J. Res. 22, 107th Cong. (2001). 
103 See William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2001), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/18/opinion/my-reasons-for-the-pardons.html. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. (“I decided to grant the pardons . . . for the following legal and foreign policy reasons: . . . many present and 
former high-ranking Israeli officials of both major political parties and leaders of Jewish communities in America 
and Europe urged the pardon of Mr. Rich.”). 
106 Id. 
107 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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proposal does not prevent a president from issuing self-serving pardons at other advantageous 
times. 
 Pardon Attorney Reform Proposals 
Pardon attorney reform proposals seeks to reform the responsibilities of the Department of 
Justice’s pardon attorney. For example, in 2000, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Representative 
Vito Fossella (R-NY-13) introduced the Pardon Attorney Reform and Integrity Act, which sought 
to codify the role the pardon attorney should take in assisting the president with issuing 
pardons, including by requiring the pardon attorney provide a report to the president on the 
Office of the Pardon Attorney’s investigation and analysis of a potential pardon.108 This bill was 
proposed and co-sponsored by Republican members of the House and Senate near the end of 
President Clinton’s time in office, which is notable because Democrats have introduced 81 
percent of the proposed pardon reform bills.109  
One of the advantages of the pardon attorney reform proposal is that it does not explicitly limit 
or constrain whom the president pardons. However, one of the disadvantages is that the 
president’s use of the Office of the Pardon Attorney is completely discretionary—meaning any 
reforms to the process will only be implemented if the president chooses to involve the pardon 
attorney.110  
Outside of the proposal to reform the Office of the Pardon Attorney, other proposals have 
called for restructuring the pardon process. For example, one proposal called for removing the 
Office of the Pardon Attorney from the purview of the Department of Justice and instead 
creating an independent clemency advisory board.111 Such proposals seek to remove bias from 
the pardon process.112  
III. Whether Reform Is Necessary 
In light of the many attempts to alter the pardon power through legislation and constitutional 
amendments, this Part examines whether reform of the pardon power is necessary. Because 
the presidential pardon power is an enumerated constitutional power, the argument that it 




108 S. 2042, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 3626, 106th Cong. (2000). 
109 See infra Appendix B. 
110 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/pardon/frequently-asked-questions.  
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Supreme Court precedent,113 Office of Legal Counsel memoranda,114 and scholarly analysis.115 
Reform also faces practical political challenges. Congress has never approved any changes to 
the pardon power despite many attempts, even during critical moments of political instability, 
such as after the pardon of President Richard Nixon.116 The combination of these legal and 
practical challenges has led some to believe that the pardon power should not be reformed.  
However, the lack of immediate checks on a president’s pardon power opens the door to 
abuses. Impeachment is an imperfect safeguard because it involves an extensive and time-
consuming process and requires broad support in Congress. Furthermore, the ultimate 
outcome of a successful impeachment process—removal from office—is a severe penalty that 
may only be appropriate for the most egregious abuses of the pardon power. Many White 
Houses have attempted to bring standardization and oversight to the clemency process by 
involving the Department of Justice’s Office of the Pardon Attorney. But, as the Department of 
Justice has recognized, the president’s use of the Office of the Pardon Attorney is completely 
discretionary.117 Thus, the Office of the Pardon Attorney is not truly able to hold the president 
accountable for any abuse of the pardon power.  
The president is currently able to issue pardons that violate fundamental principles of 
transparency and fairness and run contrary to the president’s duty to “faithfully execute the 
Office of President.”118 Legislation or an amendment that would place a limit on these types of 
pardons and strengthen the public’s confidence that pardons are principally aimed at 
tempering justice with mercy, rather than merely as a tool for a president to provide personal 
favors to friends. 
IV. Our Recommendations 
Through understanding the history and development of the pardon power in England, the 
American colonies, and in the United States Constitution, along with an assessment of past and 
current proposals to reform the presidential pardon power, we recommend three reforms: (1) a 




113 See supra Part I.B. 
114 See Presidential or Legislative Pardon of the President, supra note 80, at 371 (“[I]t has been the position of the 
Department of Justice that Congress cannot enact pardoning legislation . . .”).  
115 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 81 (“[T]he pardon power was created as a unilateral check on the power of the 
legal system to inflict punishment.”). 
116 See infra Appendix B. 
117 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 110. 
118 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Examining the Constitutional Role of the Pardon Power: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) 
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president from granting pre-conduct pardons; and (3) executive orders more clearly defining 
the process for issuing pardons and bringing more transparency to the process. Each 
recommendation is assessed in this Part based on policy, practical, and legal considerations.  
 Legislation Banning the President from Pardoning Himself or Herself 
Congress should pass legislation prohibiting the president from issuing a pardon to himself or 
herself. Self-pardons violate bedrock principles of our legal system, especially the maxims that 
everyone is equal before the law and that no one should be a judge in their own case. Although 
the Supreme Court has looked askance at legislatively restricting the pardon power,119 the 
Constitution’s pardon clause uses language that suggests the president cannot issue self-
pardons. Specifically, the clause’s authorization for the president to “grant” pardons implies a 
grantor-grantee relationship in which there must be at least two parties: one to grant a pardon 
and another to receive it.120  
1. Policy Considerations: Is legislation prohibiting self-pardons good policy? 
Presidential self-pardons seem to violate the basic principles upon which the U.S. government 
and legal system rest. A 1974 memorandum from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal 
Counsel concluded that self-pardons were contrary to “the fundamental rule that no one may 
be a judge in his own case.”121 And while the president’s power to grant pardons is extra-
judicial in the sense that it is done outside the confines of the standard criminal legal process, 
no other American citizen has the unilateral power to absolve themself of criminal liability.  
In addition to violating the maxim that no person may be the judge in his or her own case, 
permitting the president to pardon himself or herself seems to run contrary to the principle 
that no one is above the law. A scenario in which a president commits a crime and then 
pardons himself or herself for it may seem unlikely, but the mere possibility is reason enough to 
erect a guardrail in the form of a ban on presidential self-pardons. While many of the 
arguments put forward here involve legal considerations, their foundations are more normative 
than they are legal. To legislatively prohibit a president from pardoning himself or herself 
affirms and codifies what is embedded in the American consciousness: that all are equal before 




119 See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266, 267 (1974) (holding that Congress cannot “modif[y], abridge[], or 
diminish[]” the pardon power and that any limits on the pardon power “must be found in the Constitution itself”); 
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 351 (1866) (referring to the president’s pardon power as “unlimited,” except for the 
constitutional prohibition “in cases of impeachment” ). 
120 Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 states, in part, that “[t]he President shall . . . have power to grant Reprieves and 
Pardons. . . .” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
121 Presidential or Legislative Pardon of the President, supra note 80, at 370. 
 
Democracy Clinic 21 
Is a legislative ban on self-pardons the best way to prohibit the president from pardoning 
himself or herself? The better question may be whether a legislative ban on self-pardons is 
likelier to become reality than a constitutional amendment or a self-imposed executive order. 
Given the divided political environment gripping Congress and most of the states,122 it seems 
highly unlikely that a constitutional amendment could win ratification. Political polarization 
aside, the Pew Research Center found that since the Constitutional Convention of 1787, 12,000 
amendments have been proposed in Congress and only 33 have been sent to the states.123 It 
seems just as unlikely that a president would impose a restriction on himself or herself by 
issuing an executive order banning self-pardons.  
2. Practical Considerations: Can a legislative ban on self-pardons pass Congress 
with a veto-proof majority? 
On the surface, there appears to be nothing inherently partisan about legislation prohibiting 
presidential self-pardons. The pardon power is, or at least can be, apolitical. Thus, members of 
Congress might put politics aside to uphold the aforementioned values and principles that 
undergird our system of government and laws. Further, a president may hesitate to veto a self-
pardon ban out of concern that the public might infer that he was engaged in some form of 
nefarious behavior that may require a self-pardon to avoid criminal liability. The avoidance of 
this political embarrassment or shame may compel his signature on legislation that prohibits 
self-pardons. 
However, presidents and, in many cases, their political parties are likely to resist attempts to 
reduce the power of the presidency. A self-pardon ban would scale back the powers of the 
presidency and, therefore, encounter opposition from the president and members of Congress 
who belong to the president’s party. 
While political considerations are not reason to permanently discard the practical possibility of 
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3. Legal Considerations: Can legislation that bans self-pardons withstand a 
challenge to its constitutionality? 
The Constitution and Supreme Court precedent supports a ban on self-pardons. Inherent in 
Article II’s use of the word “grant” is the grantor-grantee relationship between one person who 
is the grantor and another who is the grantee, or between one grantor and one group of 
grantees. One person cannot serve as both grantor and grantee.124 As previously noted, the 
Supreme Court in Schick v. Reed mandated that any limit on the pardon power be found in the 
Constitution’s text.125 Finding that limit in a word in the Article II pardon power clause—
“grant”—is consistent with the holding in Schick. Further, in Biddle v. Perovich, the Court stated 
that the “public welfare” is a factor in considering uses of the pardon power.126 It is difficult to 
imagine how a president pardoning himself or herself to avoid prosecution or incarceration 
could serve the “public welfare.”  
A court could plausibly rely on the preceding arguments to validate a ban on self-pardons. 
However, ample precedent could also support a ruling against a prohibition. Indeed, a bevy of 
Supreme Court decisions indicate that the pardon power is absolute. Perhaps the most 
expansive of the Court’s decisions regarding the pardon power is Ex parte Garland. There, the 
Court, as previously noted, held that the pardon power is “unlimited” except for the limitations 
found in the text of the Constitution127 and “is not subject to legislative control.”128 In Ex parte 
Grossman, the Court reached a similar conclusion.129 Chief Justice (and former President) 
William Howard Taft wrote that “[t]he executive can reprieve or pardon all offenses after their 
commission, either before trial, during trial or after trial, by individuals, or by classes, 
conditionally or absolutely, and this without modification or regulation by Congress.”130 
Although Supreme Court precedent does not provide a substantial opening for limitations on 
the pardon power, the Court has never explicitly addressed the issue of a president issuing a 
self-pardon because no president has done so. Furthermore, in analyzing the legality of a self-
pardon ban, great weight should be given to the fact that a presidential self-pardon violates 
some of the most foundational democratic values of this country: that no one can be the judge 
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 Legislation Prohibiting the President from Granting Pre-Conduct 
Pardons  
Congress should pass legislation barring the president from issuing pardons for actions that 
have not yet occurred. In United States v. Wilson, Chief Justice John Marshall proclaimed that 
“[a] pardon is an act of grace.”131 Marshall may have reasoned that in considering when and to 
whom to grant a pardon, the president makes a determination that the grantee is facing a 
punishment that is too harsh or is worthy of another opportunity not available to him or her 
without a pardon. Incumbent upon Marshall’s view of a pardon as “an act of grace” and the 
president’s determination that the potential grantee is a worthy recipient is what happened 
first: an act was committed. 
It is important to note that there is a key difference between pre-conduct pardons and pre-
emptive pardons. Banning the president from granting pre-conduct pardons means pardons 
cannot be granted or offered prior to the “offense”; banning pre-emptive pardons would 
prohibit the president from granting pardons prior to indictment or before charges are filed 
against the offending individual. We propose the former, not the latter. 
1. Policy Considerations: Is legislation prohibiting a president from granting pre-
conduct pardons good policy? 
Consider the following hypothetical: President A, running for re-election, has learned that a 
large number of wealthy 17-year-olds, despite their age barring them from making campaign 
donations, are eager to see President A win a second term. Pressed for cash, President A would 
greatly benefit from a sudden influx of campaign donations, and privately instructs her 
campaign manager, Person B, to tell the 17-year-olds that it is quite alright for them to donate, 
and that they should, if prompted, lie about their ages and say they are all 18 years old.132 
Person B, aware that he would likely violate campaign finance laws if he did this, expresses his 
discomfort and hesitation to President A. President A dismisses Person B’s concerns, telling him 
she will grant him a pardon prior to him giving the instructions to the 17-year-olds.   
Legislation banning the president from offering or granting a pre-conduct pardon would 
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Additionally, some uses of pre-conduct pardons—such as pardoning all violations of certain 
laws in advance—would be tantamount to a suspension of those laws, which would encroach 
on Congress’s legislative powers. This ban would decrease the possibility of bribery-related 
behavior, maintain Congress’s proper role in the lawmaking process, and reinforce the tenet 
that Chief Justice Marshall put forward: pardons are meant to lessen or remove the 
punishments imposed by the state on an offending individual who, in the president’s judgment, 
deserves such grace. 
2. Practical Consideration: Can a legislative prohibition on pre-conduct pardons 
pass Congress with a veto-proof majority? 
The practical considerations here are not dissimilar from the ones discussed for the legislative 
ban on self-pardons. Congress passing legislation that prohibits the president from granting a 
pre-conduct pardon seems, on the surface, to be relatively uncontroversial. However, one may 
conceive of situations in which the president may wish to issue pre-conduct pardons to serve 
national security or foreign policy priorities—areas over which both the Supreme Court and the 
Congress have given the executive branch broad discretion.134 Perhaps, when considering these 
kinds of situations, Congress would be wary of legislation banning presidential pre-conduct 
pardons if lawmakers think such legislation may unduly hinder the president’s decision-making 
and order-giving capacities in times of national crises. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton believed the 
president could use the pardon power to quell insurrections.135  
But lawmakers and the president might be willing to look past these considerations in the face 
of the strong constitutional arguments against pre-conduct pardons. The Constitution’s 
authorization to the president to pardon “offenses against the United States” implies that the 
“offenses” have already taken place.136 Congress and the president may very well conclude that 
the national interest is never truly served when the president oversteps the office’s powers.  
3. Legal Considerations: Is legislation that prohibits a president from granting pre-
conduct pardons constitutional? 
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the illegitimacy of pre-conduct pardons. In Ex 
parte Garland, the Court held, “[The pardon power] extends to every offence known to the law, 
and may be exercised at any time after its commission. . . .”137 In light of the Court’s explanation 
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pre-conduct pardons is merely a legislative clarification of a pre-existing provision in the 
Constitution. By granting a pardon to an individual before he commits his offense, the president 
would violate a clear restriction imposed on him or her by the language of Article II.138 Pardons 
may not be granted to individuals who have not committed an offense; a presidential pardon 
can only be properly effectuated when it is granted in response to an offense.139  
 Executive Order(s) Requiring Reporting to Congress on Pardons to 
Certain Individuals and Creating a Clear Process for Considering and 
Granting Pardons 
The president should use executive orders to establish more detailed policies in the executive 
branch for use of the pardon power. First, the president should implement a post hoc 
requirement for providing information and documents to Congress about pardons granted by 
the president to members of the president’s family; an officer of the United States whom the 
president appointed; the vice president; members of the Executive Office of the President who 
report directly to the president; and the White House chief-of-staff, or a similar post if the 
chief-of-staff position is not filled. Second, the president should set a procedure for considering 
and granting pardons, including defining the roles and responsibilities of the following 
individuals and offices: the president, the White House Counsel’s Office, the deputy attorney 
general, and the Office of the Pardon Attorney. 
Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, both professors of government at Harvard University, write 
about the significance of what they refer to as “executive forbearance.”140 Specifically, they 
note how President George Washington “worked hard to establish norms and practices that 
would complement—and strengthen—constitutional rules.”141 From Washington’s scrupulous 
choices and actions while he served as president for eight years came “[n]orms of presidential 
restraint.”142 Into the 20th century, “presidents abided by established norms of self-limitation,” 
and notably “never used pardons for self-protection or narrow political gain, and most sought 
the advice of the Justice Department before issuing them.”143 As it relates to pardons, the 
“executive forbearance” so dutifully and purposefully established by Washington began to 
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President George H. W. Bush’s Iran-Contra pardons in December 1992 and President Clinton’s 
pardons of his brother and Marc Rich in January 2001 raised serious questions about the 
motivations for the pardons.144 They appeared to be markedly different from past controversial 
pardons, such as President Ford’s pardon of former President Nixon and President Carter’s 
pardons of the Vietnam War draft dodgers,145 in that Bush’s and Clinton’s had more markings of 
self-interest than national interest.146  
For so much of U.S. history, presidents chose to execute the duties of their office with restraint 
and measured fortitude.147 Now, the presidency is described as a “constitutional battering 
ram.”148 Presidents should emulate Washington’s “executive forbearance” and return to self-
imposing regulations on their use of the pardon power.149 
1. Policy Considerations: Are executive orders the best way to bring more 
transparency and process to the pardon-granting procedure? 
All it takes to establish a norm is for one person to do something and the next person to pick up 
where the first person left off. Issuing and subsequently abiding by executive orders that seek 
to build transparency and consistency into a process—considering and granting pardons—that 
at times is the antithesis of transparency and consistency, is a most formidable undertaking. 
Given the aforementioned examples, a president’s pardon of a close associate or family 
member is inherently controversial and raises serious, justified questions about a president’s 
rationale for doing so. Do the American people have the right to know the reasons for each and 
every decision a president makes? From a purely logistical perspective, that would be 
impossible to accomplish. But for noteworthy, uncommon, or perhaps suspect decisions that a 
president makes, it is not unreasonable for the president to be prepared to offer some 
background on how or why he or she arrived at a particular decision. 
A reporting requirement could even impact a president’s decision to issue certain pardons. 
Knowing that pardons of certain individuals would trigger increased disclosure to Congress and, 
in effect, the public, could lead a president to think twice about the prudence of granting such a 
pardon. As a result, a president may be more motivated to grant pardons he knows he can 
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motivator—to people he knows are worthy grantees. It is also worthwhile for a president to 
expend energy to further solidify and define the process for considering and granting pardons 
and to subsequently mandate that the president, the White House Counsel’s Office, the deputy 
attorney general, and the Office of the Pardon Attorney uphold that process and ensure across-
the-board accountability.  
2. Practical Considerations: Why are these executive orders more attractive 
options than legislation? 
While it might be constitutional for Congress to pass reporting requirements for when a 
president pardons a family member or close associate, it is hard to imagine that any 
president—let alone one whose political party retains majorities in both the House and the 
Senate—would not veto any such legislation. The president is likely armed with a good reason 
for a veto: granting a pardon—even one to a family member or close associate that appears to 
be entirely reasonable and justified—often involves an appraisal of a grantee’s sensitive, 
personal information. Agreeing to transmit such information in a way that may put at risk the 
grantee’s privacy or security is likely not something a president is going to be forced into doing.  
Additionally, the president would almost certainly oppose legislation establishing a process for 
issuing pardons because he or she would like to retain the flexibility provided by executive 
order to easily amend or improve the processes. 
3. Legal Considerations: Are there any concerning issues with the legality or 
constitutionality of these executive orders?  
As the sole grantor of the pardon power outlined in Article II of the Constitution and the head 
of the executive branch, the president has broad discretion to reform the pardon power in a 
way that promotes transparency and consistency. A more transparent and consistent process—
especially one that the president has created himself or herself or agreed to leave in place one 
implemented by a predecessor—will not likely raise, at least facially, serious legal or 
constitutional questions. 
V. Conclusion   
The pardon power can serve valuable purposes. Wrongful prosecutions and mishaps in the 
judicial process need a remedy. Even where there are no errors, some who are convicted of 
crimes deserve leniency that ordinary processes cannot provide. But the pardon power as it 
currently exists is too unfettered. The reforms we recommend are needed to prevent president 
from hijacking the pardon power to serve his or her own interests. If implemented, these 
reforms will provide assurances that the authority to grant pardons will be exercised to serve 







Appendix A: State Pardon Provisions 
(Based on: Margaret Colgate Love, Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process: 
What the President Can Learn from the States, 
9 U. St. Thomas L. Rev. 730 (2012)) 
State Pardon Process Frequency of Grants 
AL Independent board appointed by governor exercises 
pardon power, except governor has authority in capital 
cases. Ala. Const. amend. 38 (amending Art. V § 124); Ala. 
Code §§ 15-22-20 through 15-22-40. The board must 
make a full annual report to the governor. § 15-22-24(b). 
Frequent and Regular: More than 
500 pardons granted annually; 
2000+ restoration of rights. 
AK Governor decides; parole board must be consulted but 
advice not binding. Alaska Const. art. III, § 21; Alaska Stat. 
§ 33.20.080. 
Rare: Only three pardons since 
1995. 
AZ Governor decides, but may not act without affirmative 
clemency board recommendation. Ariz. Const. art. V, § 5; 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-402(A). Governor must publish 
reasons for each grant, and report regularly to legislature. 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-445, -446. 
Infrequent: Pardons increasingly 
rare since 1990; Gov. Brewer 
issued only 12 pardons in her six 
years in office, all in her last 
year. Gov. Ducey has issued no 
pardons to date.  
AR Governor decides; parole board must be consulted but 
advice not binding. Ark. Const. art. VI, § 18; Ark. Code Ann. 
§ 16-93-204(a). Governor must report to legislature on all 
grants with reasons. Ark. Const. art. VI, § 18. 
Frequent and Regular: About 100 
grants each year, 300-500 
applications annually. 
CA Governor decides; parole board may be consulted. For 
recidivists, board must be consulted and majority of 
supreme court justices must recommend. Cal. Const. art. 
V, § 8; Cal. Penal §§ 4800, 4812-4813, 4852.16. Governor 
report grants to legislature, including facts and reasons for 
grants. Cal. Const. art. V, § 8; Cal. Penal § 4852.16. 
Frequent and Regular: Very few 
pardons between 1990 and 2011, 
but Gov. Jerry Brown granted over 
1,000 pardons in the following 
eight years. 
CO Governor decides, “subject to such regulation as may be 
prescribed by law relative to the manner of applying.” 
Colo. Const. art. IV, § 7. Non-statutory advisory scheme; 
Governor sends legislature “a transcript of the petition, all 
proceedings, and the reasons for his action.” Colo. Const. 
art. IV, § 7. 
Infrequent: Pardons infrequent 
since 1990s, although Gov. Bill 
Ritter issued almost 30 pardons at 
the end of his term in 2011. 
CT 
Independent board appointed by governor exercises 
pardon power. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-124a(f). 
Frequent and Regular: About 400 
pardons annually, including 
provisional pardons (about 30% of 
applicants get hearing, most of 









Governor decides, but may not act without affirmative 
clemency board recommendation. Del. Const. art. VII, § 1. 
Governor must report periodically to legislature. Id. 
Frequent and Regular: Over 250 
pardons annually in recent years 
(about 85% of applications 
received are approved by Board 
and 90% of those granted by 
governor). Applications have 
tripled since 2005. 
DC President decides under a non-statutory advisory scheme. 
U.S. Const. art II, § 2. 
Rare: Only a handful of DC 
offenders have been pardoned by 
the president since 1980. 
FL Governor decides with concurrence of two cabinet 
officials. The governor and three cabinet officials act as 
pardon board. Fla. Const. art. IV, § 8 (a); Fla. Stat. ch. 
940.01, 940.05. Governor reports to legislature each 
restoration and pardon. Id. at 940.01. 
Sparing: 20-40 pardon grants 
annually between 2006 and 2010; 
20-30 firearms restoration grants 
annually (about half of 
applications). Restorations of 
rights number in thousands. 
GA 
Independent board appointed by governor exercises 
pardon power. Ga. Const. art. IV, § 2, para. II. Board must 
report annually to legislature, the attorney general and 
the governor. Ga. Code Ann. § 42-9-19. 
Frequent and Regular: Between 
300-400 pardons without 
restoration of gun rights; 100 
pardons with gun rights, several 
hundred “restoration of rights” 
(approx. 35% of applicants); 
immigration pardons. 
HI 
Governor decides; parole board may be consulted. Haw. 
Const. art. V, § 5; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 353-72. 
Uneven: Gov. Abercrombie issued 
33 pardons, fewer than his 
predecessors. Gov. Lingle granted 
132 pardons in eight years, 55 in 
her last year (2010). About 50 
applications filed per year. 
ID Independent board appointed by governor decides all but 
violent and drug offenses, which must be approved by 
governor. Idaho Const. art. IV, § 7; Idaho Code Ann. §§ 20-
210, 20-240. 
Frequent and Regular: In recent 
years 20-30 grants annually, from 
30-60% of applications filed. 
IL 
Governor decides, although “the manner of applying 
therefore may be regulated by law.” Ill. Const. art. V, § 12. 
Prisoner Review Board authorized to provide advice to 
governor. 730 Ill. Comp. Stat, Ann. 5/3-3-1(a)(3). 
Uneven, varies with 
administration: Between 2009 and 
April 2014, Gov. Quinn granted 
1,075 pardons, about half of those 
that applied. Since 2014 many 
fewer granted by Gov. Rauner, 
though still regular practice. Board 
hears 800 applications each year. 
IN Governor decides, “subject to such regulations as may be 
provided by law.” Ind. Const. art. 5, § 17. Parole board 
makes advisory recommendations to governor. Ind. Const. 
Sparing: Gov. Pence issued only 
three pardons. Gov. Daniels 
granted 62 pardons during his 







art. 5, § 17; Ind. Code §§ 11-9-2-1 to 11-9-2-3. Governor 
reports to legislature. Ind. Const. art. 5, § 17. 
favorably on about half of those 
recommended by board. 
IA 
Governor decides, “subject to such regulations as may be 
provided by law.” Iowa Const. art. IV, § 16. Parole board 
authorized to provide advice. Iowa Code §§ 914.1-914.7. 
Governor reports to legislature on pardons issued and 
reasons. Iowa Const. art. IV, § 16. 
Uneven, varies with 
administration: Average of 35 full 
pardons each year between 2005 
and 2011 (fewer since 2009 and in 
recent years increasingly rare), 
with another 30-60 grants to 
restore civil rights and firearms 
privileges. 
KS Governor decides, subject to regulations and restrictions 
by law. Kan. Const. art. I, § 7. The governor is required to 
seek the advice of the prisoner review board, though not 
bound to follow it. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3701(4). Reports 
to legislature on each pardon application but need not 
give reasons. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3703. 
Rare: Pardons very rare, primarily 
for miscarriage of justice. 
KY 
Governor decides, parole board may be consulted. Ky. 
Const. § 77. Governor may also restore rights of 
citizenship, office. Id. §§ 145, 150. Governor reports to 
legislature reasons for each grant. Id. § 77. 
Uneven: Pardons during term have 
been rare, but Gov. Bevin 
departed from this practice, 
announcing ten pardons in July 
2017 and indicating there would 
be more. 
LA 
“Upon favorable recommendation of the Board of 
Pardons,” the governor may pardon “those convicted of 
offenses against the state.” La. Const. art. IV, § 5(E)(1); La. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:572(A). 
Infrequent/Uneven: In four years, 
Gov. Jindal issued 36 pardons and 
commuted one sentence, failing to 
act on hundreds of 
recommendations from the Board. 
Previous governors granted 331 (in 
four years) and 476 (in eight 
years). Gov. Edwards granted over 
3,000 in 16 years. 
ME 
Governor decides, subject to regulation “relative to the 
manner of applying.” Non-statutory advisory scheme. Me. 
Const. art. V, pt. 1, § 11. 
Infrequent/Uneven: As of April 
2013, Gov. LePage had granted 
only about 30 pardons since taking 
office in 2011. Between 2002 and 
2011, Gov. Baldacci granted 131 
pardons, 51 in his final year. In the 
past, about 50 hearings each year, 
25% result in pardon. 
MD Governor decides; parole board may be consulted. Md. 
Const. art. II, § 20; Md. Code Ann., Correctional Services § 
7-206(3)(ii). Constitution requires governor to publish 
notice of intention to grant, and to report grants to 
legislature with reasons. Md. Const. art. II, § 20. 
Sparing/Uneven: As of August 
2017, Gov. Hogan had granted no 
pardons. Gov. O’Malley granted 
about 150 pardons in his eight 







2007) granted 228 pardons out of 
a total of 439 applications. 
MA Governor may not act without affirmative 
recommendation of Governor’s Council. Mass. Const. pt. 
2, ch. II, § I, art. VIII. Governor must report to legislature 
annually with a list of pardons granted, but not required 
to give reasons. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 152 (2011). 
Rare: Pardons infrequent since 
early 1990s, only four since 2002 
(by Gov. Patrick at the end of his 
term). 
MI 
Governor decides, parole board must be consulted but 
advice not binding. Mich. Const. art. 5, § 14; Mich. Comp. 
Laws §§ 791.243, 791.244. Must inform the legislature 
annually of pardons and reasons. Const. art. 5, § 14. 
Infrequent/Uneven: Pardons rare 
prior to 2006 (only 34 pardons 
between 1969 and 2006). Gov. 
Granholm granted 20 pardons, 100 
commutations; Gov. Rick Snyder 
granted no pardons during first 
term, 11 at start of second. 
MN 
Governor and high officials (attorney general, chief 
justice) act as board exercising power. Minn. Const. art. V, 
§ 7. Board required to report to legislature by February 15 
each year. Minn. Stat. § 638.075. 
Regular but sparing; 10-20 pardons 
each year, about one-third of 
those whose cases are heard. Only 
those deemed eligible are 
permitted to file an application, 
and waivers of the eligibility 
waiting period are rarely granted.  
MS 
Governor decides, parole board may be consulted. Miss. 
Const. art. 5, § 124. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-5(3). 
Infrequent/Uneven. No regular 
process. Almost 200 post-sentence 
pardons at end of Gov. Barbour’s 
term considered irregular and 
unusual. 
MO 
Governor grants reprieves and pardons, subject to rules 
and regulations prescribed for “the manner of applying.” 
Mo. Const. art. IV, § 7. Parole board must be consulted, 
but advice not binding. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 217.800.2. 
Infrequent/Uneven: Gov. Nixon 
granted 110 pardons during his 
eight years in office (2009-2017), 
but prior to that very few in recent 
years. Number of applications has 
increased dramatically, in part 
because of extension of firearms 
restrictions to long guns in 2008. 
MT Governor may grant pardons and commutations, and 
must consult with Board of Pardons and Parole, but since 
March 2015 he may grant clemency even if board 
recommends denial. Mont. Const. art. VI, § 12; Mont. 
Code Ann. §§ 46-23-104(4), 46-23-301(3)(b). Governor 
must report grants to legislature including reasons. § 46-
23-316. 
Infrequent: Between 2005 and 
present, only 25 individuals 
pardoned. 
NE Governor and high officials (secretary of state and 
attorney general) act as board of pardon that exercises 
power. Neb. Const. art. IV, § 13. Governor chairs board. 
Frequent and Regular: Over 100 
pardons granted each year 
between 2002 and 2013, plus 







revocations. About 70% of 
grantees also regained firearms 
privileges. 50% of applicants are 
granted, one-third 
misdemeanants. 
NV Governor and high officials (justices of Supreme Court and 
attorney general) act as board exercising power. Nev. 
Const. art. 5, § 14. Governor must report to the legislature 
at the beginning of each session every clemency action 
(no reasons necessary). Nev. Const. art. 5, § 13. 
Frequent and Regular: An average 
of 60 grants each year since 2013, 
more than half of those that apply. 
(In 2017, 83 applied, 60 heard, 55 
granted.) 
NH 
Governor acts upon the advice of the Executive Council. 
N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 52. Governor traditionally will not 
act without majority recommendation from Council. 
Rare: The ttorney general receives 
about 25 applications for clemency 
per year, but only two pardons 
and two sentence commutations 
since 1996. 
NJ Governor decides, parole board may be consulted. N.J. 
Const. art. V, § 2, para. 1. Governor must report annually 
to the legislature the particulars of each grant, with the 
reasons. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:167-3.1. 
Infrequent: Recent governors have 
granted relatively few pardons, 
and generally only at end of their 
terms. 
NM 
Governor decides, (“[s]ubject to such regulations as may 
be prescribed by law”). N.M. Const. art. V, § 6. Parole 
Board may be consulted. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-17. 
Infrequent: Pardons granted only 
in “extraordinary circumstances.” 
Relatively infrequent (Gov. 
Martinez has issued no pardons; 
Gov. Richardson issued 80 pardons 
in ten years). 
NY 
Governor decides, subject to regulation in “the manner of 
applying for pardons.” N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 4. Governor 
must report annually to legislature on pardons but not his 
reasons for granting them. Id. 
Uneven: As of July 1, 2017, Gov. 
Cuomo had granted only seven 
pardons, most for immigration 
purposes. Also, more than 100 
“conditional” pardons through the 
youthful offender program. Gov. 
Paterson granted 33 immigration 
pardons in 2010, and a handful of 
others. 
NC Governor’s power unlimited, subject only to regulation in 
the manner of applying. N.C. Const. art. III, § 5(6). Post 
Release Supervision and Parole Commission has authority 
to assist the governor in exercising the power. N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 143B-720(a). 
Rare: Only six pardons since 2001, 
all granted for innocence. Pardon 
applications average about 150 
annually. 
ND Governor decides, N.D. Const. art. V, § 7, and may appoint 
a “pardon advisory board,” consisting of the attorney 
general, two members of the parole board, and two 
citizens. N.D. Cent. Code § 12-55.1-02. 
Infrequent: Between 2005 and 
2009, 163 applications received 
but only six pardons granted. 
OH Governor decides in consultation with parole board. Must 
report to legislature details of each commutation and 
Sparing: Gov. Kasich granted 86 







pardon granted, and reasons for each. Ohio Const. art. III, 
§ 11; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.07. 
Strickland granted 290 pardons in 
four years, mostly to minor non-
violent offenses. 
OK Governor decides, may not act without affirmative 
recommendation of board of pardons and parole. Okla. 
Const. art. VI, § 10. The governor must report to the 
legislature on each grant at regular session, though not 
required to give reasons. Id. 
Frequent and Regular: About 100 
pardon grants annually (80% of 
those that apply). 
OR 
Governor decides with no provision for advice. Or. Const. 
art. V, § 14. Governor must report to the legislature each 
grant of clemency, including the reasons for the grant. Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 144.660. 
Infrequent: The governor has 
issued few pardons in recent 
years. Gov. Kate Brown has 
granted four pardons in three-and-
a-half years in office. Between 
2005 and January 2011, Gov. 
Kulongoski granted 20 pardons out 
of several hundred applications. 
PA 
Governor decides with no provision for advice. Or. Const. 
art. V, § 14. Governor must report to the legislature each 
grant of clemency, including the reasons for the grant. Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 144.660. 
Frequent and Regular: Of 500-600 
applications, Board recommends 
about 150 favorably each year, 
most of which are granted; 20% to 
misdemeanors and summary 
offenses. 
PR Governor decides. P.R. Const. art. IV, § 4. Parole Board 
may make non-binding recommendations. 
Rare: Frequency of pardon grants 
has decreased since expansion of 
expungement law in 2005. 
RI Governor pardons “by and with the advice and consent of 
the senate.” R.I. Const. art. IX, § 13. 
Rare: No pardon issued to a living 
person in many years.  
SC Independent board appointed by governor exercises 
pardon power except in capital cases (where governor 
retains power). S.C. Const. art. IV, § 14; S.C. Code Ann. § 
24-21-920. 
Frequent and Regular: Board 
issues 300-400 grants per year, 
hearing about 80-85 cases every 
two months; grants 60-65% of 
applicants. Few misdemeanants. 
SD 
Governor decides. S.D. Const. art. IV, § 3. Board of 
Pardons and Paroles must recommend pardon in order to 
obtain sealing relief. S.D. Codified Laws § 24-14-11. 
Frequent and Regular: Between 60 
and 70 applications filed annually, 
about 60% recommended by 
Board to the governor, who grants 
most of those recommended. 
TN 
Governor has the power to pardon. Tenn. Const. art. III, § 
6. Governor advised by the parole board. Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 40-28-104. Must report grants and reasons to legislature 
“when requested.” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-27-101, 107. 
Uneven: In July 2017, Gov. Bevin 
issued ten pardons, the first mid-
term pardons in Tennessee in 
many years. In January 2011, Gov. 
Bredesen granted 22 pardons 
(“collected over his eight years in 
office”), 16 of which were 








Governor decides, but may not act without affirmative 
recommendation of Board of Pardons and Parole. Tex. 
Const. art. IV, § 11(b). 
Sparing: Eight to ten pardons 
annually most years since 2001, 
and one-third of those 
recommended. 200 applications 
are received annually. 
UT 
Independent board appointed by the governor. Utah 
Const. art. VII, § 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(1). 
Infrequent: Board receives only 
three to five requests for pardon a 
year, and only about ten pardons 
have been granted in the past 
decade (availability of 
expungement makes less 
necessary). 
VT 
Governor decides; parole board may be consulted. Vt. 
Const. ch. II, § 20. 
Infrequent: Gov. Shumlin granted 
only two pardons since taking 
office in 2011. In his nearly eight 
years in office (2003-2011), Gov. 
Douglas granted 13 pardons, fewer 
than two a year. 
VA 
Governor decides; parole board may be consulted. Va. 
Const. art. V, § 12. Constitution also requires governor to 
make annual report to the legislature setting forth “the 
particulars of every case” of pardons or commutations 
granted, with reasons. Id. 
Sparing: Gov. McAuliffe pardoned 
38 individuals in his first two years 
in office, and restored rights to 
thousands. Gov. McDonnell 
restored rights generously, but 
pardoned only seven individuals. 
He also commuted two sentences 
retroactively to prevent 
deportation. Gov. Kaine pardoned 
108 individuals in his four years in 
office. 
WA 
Governor decides “under such regulations and restrictions 
as may be prescribed by law.” Wash. Const. art. III, § 9. 
Clemency board may be consulted. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 
9.94A.885 (1), 10.01.120. Governor reports to legislature 
with reasons. Wash. Const. art. III, § 11. 
Sparing: About 35 petitions each 
year, eight to ten of which go to 
hearings. Between January 2011 
and August 2017, Gov. Jay Inslee, 
denied a number of favorable 
recommendations from Board. 
Gov. Gregoire (2003-2011) granted 
27 pardons: two conditional and 
two to avoid deportations. 
WV Governor decides; may seek advice from parole board. W. 
Va. Const. art. 7, § 11; W. Va. Code § 5-1-16. Governor 
reports facts of grants with reasons. W. Va. Const. art. 7, § 
11; W. Va. Code § 5-1-16. 
Rare: Governor receives between 
50-100 applications each year, but 
pardon grants are rare (only 121 in 
36 years, by nine governors). 
WI Governor decides under a non-statutory pardon advisory 
board. Wis. Const. art. V, § 6. Governor must 
Infrequent/Uneven: Gov. Walker 
granted no pardons, and stated an 







communicate annually with legislature each case of 
clemency and the reasons. Wis. Const. art. V, § 6. 
Gov. Doyle granted 293 pardons 
overall, 176 in his final year, 
mainly for dated minor offenses, 
representing 15% of applicants, all 
with Board recommendation. Few 
misdemeanants. 
WY Governor decides, subject to legislative controls on the 
manner of applying. Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 5. Governor 
must report every two years to legislature on grants, with 
the reasons for each one. Id. 
Infrequent: Current governor has 
issued only a handful of pardons in 
eight years. From 2005 to 2010, 22 
pardons and 28 restorations of 

























Appendix B: Proposed Presidential Pardon 
Power Legislation 
 

















Thomas A. Luken. 
 
Co-sponsored by two 
Democrats. 
The president may pardon a person for an 
offense only after such person is convicted for 
such offense, unless a majority of each House 
of Congress approves of a pardon prior to such 
conviction. A two-thirds vote of each House of 
Congress may overrule any such reprieve or 
pardon granted by the president after such 













No pardon granted to an individual by the 
president shall be effective if two-thirds of 
both Houses of Congress disapproves of the 
















The president shall have the power to pardon 
only after an individual has been convicted of 
















The president shall have the power to pardon 
only after an individual has been convicted of 














Congress shall have the power to disapprove 
any reprieve or pardon granted by the 
president, and no such reprieve or pardon shall 
take effect if it is disapproved by two-thirds 
votes of both Houses of the Congress no later 






Expresses the sense of the Congress that no 

















after the person pardoned has been convicted 













Thomas A. Luken. 
 
No co-sponsors. 
The president may grant a pardon to a person 
for an offense only after such person is 
convicted for such offense, unless a majority of 
each House of Congress approves of a pardon 
prior to such conviction. States that a two-
thirds vote of each House of Congress may 
overrule any such reprieve or pardon granted 














No pardon granted to an individual by the 
president shall be effective if two-thirds of 
each House of Congress disapproves of the 















No reprieve or pardon shall be granted for an 
offense until after the filing of an indictment or 
the formal commencement of other criminal 
action with respect to that offense. 
H.J.Res. 8 (1975) 
 
Ban on Self-












Constitutional amendment stating that no 
president may pardon himself. States that no 
pardon may be granted to any person who 
holds or held the office of vice president or to 
any person who held the office of president for 
any offense, except after conviction, nor shall 
such pardon be granted unless the president 
certifies to the Congress that he is satisfied 
that such person either is innocent of the 
charges of which that person was convicted or 
is suffering from a terminal illness, and the 
Congress concurs in the granting of the pardon 






Constitutional amendment stating that no 
president may pardon himself. States that no 
pardon may be granted to any person who 
















Co-sponsored by five 
Democrats and one 
Republican. 
any person who held the office of president for 
any offense, except after conviction, nor shall 
such pardon be granted unless the president 
certifies to the Congress that he is satisfied 
that such person either is innocent of the 
charges of which that person was convicted or 
is suffering from a terminal illness, and the 
Congress concurs in the granting of the pardon 
by three-fourths vote of both Houses. 
H.R. 1627 (1975) 
 
Ban on Self-









Co-sponsored by eight 
Democrats. 
No president may pardon himself. No pardon 
may be granted to any person who holds or 
held the office of vice president or to any 
person who held the office of president for any 
offense, except after conviction, nor shall such 
pardon be granted unless the president 
certifies to the Congress that he is satisfied 
that such person either is innocent of the 
charges of which that person was convicted or 
is suffering from a terminal illness, and the 
Congress concurs in the granting of the pardon 
by three-fourths vote of both Houses. 











Congress shall have the power to disapprove 
any reprieve or pardon granted by the 
president, and no such reprieve or pardon shall 
take effect if it is disapproved by two-thirds 
vote of both Houses of the Congress no later 
than 90 days after it is granted. 












Grants Congress the power to disapprove 
reprieves and pardons granted by the 
president. 













Co-sponsored by one 
Democrat and one 
Republican. 
Prohibits the president from granting a pardon 
to a person for a federal offense for which such 
person has not been convicted, unless the 
granting of such pardon has been approved by 





















Prohibits the president from granting a pardon 
to a person for a federal offense for which such 
person has not been convicted, unless the 
granting of such pardon has been approved by 
a majority of each House of Congress. 














Co-sponsored by one 
Democrat. 
Prohibits the president from granting a pardon 
to a person for a federal offense for which such 
person has not been convicted, unless the 
granting of such pardon has been approved by 













Provides that the Congress shall have the 
power to disapprove any reprieve or pardon 
granted by the president, and no such reprieve 
or pardon shall take effect if it is disapproved 
by two-thirds votes of both Houses of the 
Congress no later than 90 days after it is 
granted. 










Andrew Jacobs Jr. 
 
No co-sponsors. 
Permits the president to grant a reprieve or a 
pardon to an individual only after such 
individual has been convicted. 










Andrew Jacobs Jr. 
 
No co-sponsors. 
Permits the president to grant a reprieve or a 
pardon to an individual only after such 
individual has been convicted. 










Andrew Jacobs Jr. 
 
Co-sponsored by ten 
Democrats and one 
independent. 
The president shall only have the power to 
grant a reprieve or a pardon for an offense to 


















Andrew Jacobs Jr. 
 
No co-sponsors. 
The president shall only have the power to 
grant a reprieve or a pardon for an offense to 










Republican Sen. Orrin 
Hatch. 
 
Co-sponsored by 12 
Republicans. 
If the president delegates to the pardon 
attorney the responsibility for investigating, in 
any particular matter or case, a potential grant 
of executive clemency, the pardon attorney 
shall prepare and make available to the 
president a written report, which shall include: 
(1) a description of efforts of the pardon 
attorney as required by this law and (2) any 









Republican Rep. Vito 
Fossella. 
 
Co-sponsored by four 
Republicans. 
If the president delegates to the pardon 
attorney the responsibility for investigating, in 
any particular matter or case, a potential grant 
of executive clemency, the pardon attorney 
shall prepare and make available to the 
president a written report, which shall include: 
(1) a description of efforts of the pardon 
attorney as required by this law and (2) any 










Democratic Rep. Barney 
Frank. 
 
Co-sponsored by one 
Democrat and one 
Republican. 
The power to grant reprieves and pardons shall 
not be exercised between October 1 of a year 
in which a presidential election occurs and 
January 21 of the year following; except that 
after October 1 in said year a president may 
delay the execution of a sentence of death 
until January 25 of the year following. All 
pardons and reprieves must be announced 









Democratic Rep. John 
Conyers Jr. 
 
Co-sponsored by 11 
Democrats. 
Not later than 30 days after an individual who 
is or was an executive branch official receives a 
pardon or reprieve from the president, the 
president shall report to Congress (1) the name 
and position of the individual who received the 
pardon or reprieve; (2) the nature of the 
offense involved; (3) the date of the pardon or 
reprieve; (4) the effect of the pardon or 
reprieve on imprisonment for an existing 
conviction, if the offense pardoned was one for 







individual was involved in any on-going 
criminal or civil investigation; (6) whether the 
president sought the recommendation of the 
lead federal official who investigated or is 
investigating the individual as to the positive or 
negative implications of the pardon or reprieve 
and the nature of that official’s 
recommendation; and (7) whether the lead 
federal official who investigated or is 
investigating the individual believes or has 
reason to believe that the pardon or reprieve 
would interfere with an on-going investigation 
and what impact the pardon or reprieve had on 
any on-going investigations into possible 
misconduct by the president, vice president, or 









Democratic Rep. Steve 
Cohen. 
 
Co-sponsored by two 
Democrats. 
The grant of a reprieve or pardon by the 
president shall become effective only on the 
review and consent of two-thirds of the 
justices of the Supreme Court, pursuant to a 
finding by such justices that the grant of such 
reprieve or pardon is consistent with the 
interests of justice and does not undermine the 
effectiveness, integrity, and impartiality of the 










Democratic Rep. Jerrold 
Nadler. 
 
Co-sponsored by nine 
Democrats. 
Expressing the sense of the House of 
Representatives that the president should not 
issue pardons to senior members of his 
administration during the final 90 days of his 
term of office. 














Expressing the sense of the House of 
Representatives that the president should not 
issue pardons to senior members of his 
administration during the final 90 days of his 
term of office. 








Democratic Rep. Al 
Green. 
The president shall have no power to grant to 
himself a reprieve or pardon for an offense 








Co-sponsored by three 
Democrats. 








Democratic Rep. Steve 
Cohen. 
 
Co-sponsored by ten 
Democrats and one 
Republican. 
The president shall not have the power to 
grant pardons and reprieves to himself or 
herself, to the president’s brother, sister, 
brother-in-law, sister-in-law, spouse, parent, 
child, or grandchild or to the spouse of the 
president’s grandchild, to the president’s aunt, 
uncle, nephew or niece or to the spouse of the 
president’s nephew or niece, or to the 
president’s first or second cousin, the spouse 
of the president’s first or second cousin, the 
president’s mother-in-law, father-in-law, son-
in-law, or daughter-in-law, or to any current or 
former member of the president’s 
administration, or to anyone who worked on 











Democratic Rep. Raja 
Krishnamoorthi. 
 
Co-sponsored by 37 
Democrats. 
Not later than three days after the president 
grants any reprieve or pardon, the attorney 
general shall publish in the Federal Register 
and on the official website of the president the 
following: (1) the name of the person 
pardoned; (2) the date on which the reprieve 
or pardon was issued; and (3) the full text of 










Democratic Rep. Ted 
Lieu. 
 
Co-sponsored by three 
Democrats. 
Requesting the president and directing the 
attorney general to transmit certain 
documents to the House of Representatives 












Democratic Rep. Karen 
Bass. 
 
Co-sponsored by 51 
Democrats. 
Expressing that the House of Representatives 
disapproves of the president granting to 
himself or any member of his family, including 
those related solely by marriage, any reprieve 





If the president grants an individual a pardon 











Democratic Rep. Adam 
Schiff. 
 
Co-sponsored by 42 
Democrats. 
in which the president, or a relative of the 
president, is a target, subject, or witness, not 
later than 30 days after the date of such 
pardon, the attorney general shall submit to 
the chairmen and ranking members of the 
appropriate congressional committees all 
materials of an investigation that were 
obtained by a United States attorney, another 
federal prosecutor, or an investigative 
authority of the federal government, relating 
to the offense for which the individual is so 
pardoned. 








Democratic Rep. Maxine 
Waters. 
 
Co-sponsored by 16 
Democrats. 
Expressing the sense of Congress that the 
president does not have the authority under 














The president shall have no power to grant to 











Democratic Rep. Steve 
Cohen. 
 
Co-sponsored by ten 
Democrats. 
The president shall not have the power to 
grant pardons and reprieves to himself or 
herself, to the president’s brother, sister, 
brother-in-law, sister-in-law, spouse, parent, 
child, or grandchild or to the spouse of the 
president’s grandchild, to the president’s aunt, 
uncle, nephew or niece or to the spouse of the 
president’s nephew or niece, or to the 
president’s first or second cousin, the spouse 
of the president’s first or second cousin, the 
president’s mother-in-law, father-in-law, son-
in-law, or daughter-in-law, or to any current or 
former member of the president’s 
administration, or to anyone who worked on 






If the president grants an individual a pardon 












Democratic Rep. Adam 
Schiff. 
 
Co-sponsored by 27 
Democrats. 
in which the president, or a relative of the 
president, is a target, subject, or witness, not 
later than 30 days after the date of such 
pardon, the attorney general shall submit to 
the chairmen and ranking members of the 
appropriate congressional committees all 
materials of an investigation that were 
obtained by a United States attorney, another 
federal prosecutor, or an investigative 
authority of the federal government, relating 











Catherine Cortez Masto. 
 
Co-sponsored by four 
Democrats. 
If the president grants an individual a pardon 
for an offense that arises from an investigation 
in which the president, or a relative of the 
president, is a target, subject, or witness, not 
later than 30 days after the date of such 
pardon, the attorney general shall submit to 
the chairmen and ranking members of the 
appropriate congressional committees all 
materials of an investigation that were 
obtained by a United States attorney, another 
federal prosecutor, or an investigative 
authority of the federal government, relating 












Democratic Rep. Raja 
Krishnamoorthi. 
 
Co-sponsored by 21 
Democrats. 
Not later than three days after the date on 
which the president grants any reprieve or 
pardon for an offense against the United 
States, the attorney general shall publish in the 
Federal Register and on the official website of 
the president the following: (1) the name of 
the person pardoned; (2) the date on which 
the reprieve or pardon was issued; and (3) the 
full text of the reprieve or pardon. 
 
 
 
